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Abstract
This article deals with the Italian working-class attitude to vote right-wing, seen in a
long-term perspective, in particular in the northern and more industrialized regions. It
stresses the fact that the left-wing parties reached their largest majority among
working-class voters only for a short period. The end of the long cycle of factory
conﬂicts of the 1970s on the one side, and the crisis of the “local political
subcultures”—Catholic and Communist—in mediating the relationship between the
working class and the central State on the other, marked the outbreak of a new
political phenomenon: the establishment of the Lega Nord party in the 1980s. This
party has been able to shift progressively from identity-based claims and secessionist
proposals to xenophobia and the demand that a priority be accorded to Italian workers
on the labour market. In the most recent years workers’ support for the Lega Nord has
been contended by a new populist competitor, the Five Star Movement, whose ability
to intercept a widespread “working-class malaise” will be tested in years to come.
Workers (of the North) on the Right
It is no longer a secret or taboo: in the new millennium, when northern Italian
workers go to the polls—the majority of the country’s ﬁve million industrial and
construction workers are concentrated there—they vote for right-wing parties.1
Perhaps due to a naive understanding of class voting, or the steadfast memory of
a once strong labor movement (the Italian working-class struggle was excep-
tional both in its political engagement and sheer persistence), this issue has
almost always been perceived in terms of “abandonment,” if not an outright
“betrayal” of the Left.
Whether the workers betrayed the Left or vice versa, the fact remains that
in recent years the grass roots of the Center Left and its principal party, the
Partito Democratico (PD), are found among the public sector (a particular
stronghold being teachers) rather than the self-employed; white-collar rather
than blue-collar workers; pensioners rather than those who are still employed;
but above all, more in the Center and South of the country than in the North.
In particular, the working-class vote seems to be split along a territorial
divide: The workers in the northern regions (Lombardy and Veneto ﬁrst and
foremost), where the industrial working class was concentrated, now vote
mostly for right-wing parties.
But which Right has managed to grasp a signiﬁcant slice of the working-
class vote? As we will see better below, the working-class right-wing party in
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Italy has been the Lega Nord (LN); one of its leading exponents went so far as to
deﬁne it “the new labour party.”2 Founded on local concerns, ethnic and
identity-based claims, and secessionist proposals, LN is a right-wing populist,
but not fascist, party.3 In more recent years it has shifted its position toward
issues of sovereignty, centred on violent controversy against immigration,
European austerity policies, ﬁscal pressure, and the universal welfare state. In
this way, LN has managed to tap into the apprehensions of all the social
groups impoverished and disadvantaged by the economic crisis and
globalization.
In the past, there had also been some working-class consensus towards
Forza Italia (FI), the personal political party established by entrepreneur
Silvio Berlusconi. However, despite efforts to validate an “Italian dream” of
social mobility and “the self-made man,” Berlusconi has always been viewed
by the working class as an employer, thus not to be trusted completely. Of
less importance—at least in the North—have been the parties to Berlusconi’s
right, even when they harken back to the traditions of social fascism.
Recently, the Neo-Fascist party Casa Pound Italia (CPI) has sought visibil-
ity and consensus among workers by siding with them in some local protests
against industrial closures and restructuring. One such episode was in Terni, a
small town in central Italy, home to one of the largest public steelworks in
Italy—privatised during the 1990s, and eventually sold to the multinational
ThyssenKrupp.4 In 2014, ThyssenKrupp announced it was laying off ﬁve
hundred workers. CPI attempted to join the protest with the slogan
“Nationalise the Terni steelworks,” but failed to establish a true relationship
with the workers.5 Indeed their action led to widespread anti-fascist protests
in the town.6
Nonetheless, a mere analysis of voting and party policies would hardly con-
stitute an exhaustive exploration of this rightward shift among industrial
workers and the working class more generally: It is indeed difﬁcult to position
populist movements along the traditional right-left axis or to interpret rising
abstention from voting—after years of exceptional turnouts, the gap between
Italy and the majority of European countries has narrowed.7
More recent qualitative analyses paint a picture of widespread “working-
class malaise” fuelled by a mixture of factors both material (growing job insecu-
rity, economic impoverishment, loss of rights) and cultural (depreciation of
manual labor, erosion of working-class identity, the disappearance of forms of
class sociality). The proﬁle of the typical Italian worker, especially younger
workers, is characterised by feelings of apathy, solitude, fear, and frustration.
One investigative journalist revealed widespread use of narcotics among
workers, which was a response to this personal anxiety, but also a means of
maintaining the standards of productivity demanded by employers.8 Since the
global ﬁnancial crisis there have been several cases of suicide among despairing
job seekers.9
The deterioration in human relations and solidarity in the workplace can be
seen ﬁrstly in the mistrust, if not open hostility, expressed towards immigrant
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workers—more recently their identity has become confused with that of the ref-
ugees disembarking daily on the coast of Sicily. Factories with high numbers of
foreign workers witness a mixture of “social passivity, widespread individualistic
behaviour and unquestioning acceptance of working conditions.”10
While overall trade union membership has increased, thanks to pensioners
and public sector employees, there has been a clear fall in membership among
industrial workers.11 Though workers turn more and more to the unions for
ﬁscal, legal, and social security services, their engagement in matters related
to policy and negotiation have receded. A survey carried out in 2006 by the
Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL), the principal left-wing
union in Italy, registered overwhelming right-wing leanings among workers in
the North as well as clear preferences for unions without political afﬁliations,
but with a more collaborative approach towards employers.12 It seems that it
is precisely politics that has lost its appeal among workers, even among those
communities that have been involved in conﬂicts or protests—often carried
out in open disagreement with trade unions.13 It seems possible today to ﬁght
for acquired rights or job security without investing in the struggle with values
that goes beyond the immediate circumstances.
The Italian Case
If northern Italian workers vote mostly for the Right and prefer apolitical trade
unions, what can we say has become of the Italian case? During the 1960s and
1970s, Italy was the scene of a series of labor struggles that were among the
most militant and tenacious in the West. The strongly politicized Italian trade
union movement had an exceptional capacity for mass mobilization. The key
position of workers and the authority exerted by wage earners were corner-
stones of the political discourse both for the historical Left—whether
Communist or Socialist—and the vast constellation of the “New Left.”
However, Italy was never a “nation of workers” like Great Britain or
Germany. Industrial development occurred late, developed quickly, and was
subsidized but spread unevenly across the territory. The workers’ movement
and socialism started in the countryside, among share-croppers and farm
laborers, and with decidedly local connotations and a strong avant-garde
intellectual component. In the very apt words of one communist historian:
“ideas (in Italy) came faster than machines and capital.”14
An important role in the development of the workers’ movement was
played by the imbalance between the North—where the ﬁrst industries were
established and the ﬁrst entrepreneurial capitals were created—and the
extended southern reaches of the country—plagued by an economy based on
large agricultural estates, political corruption, and organized crime.
Addressing his fellow Communists Antonio Gramsci had already identiﬁed
the “southern issue” as “one of the fundamental policy problems facing the
nation’s revolutionary proletariat”15—for decades it remained a non-negotiable
cornerstone of Italian trade union policy.16 Between the two world wars,
“Italians First” 103
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authoritarian modernization under fascism consolidated the industrial mono-
poly of the North West (the so-called “industrial triangle”) and interventions
of the State in the economy. Smaller communities of skilled, industrial urban
proletariat continued to live alongside larger groups of workers who ﬂuctuated
between agriculture and industry, including a large and fragmented subordinate
female proletariat.17 Despite the corporate regulations and welfare measures
introduced by the regime, working conditions continued to be precarious and
underdeveloped.
In the wake of the SecondWorldWar, Italy undertook an exceptional drive
towards political and social restitution, yet failed, nonetheless, to redress its
huge internal territorial fracture. During the 1960s, millions of young people
emigrated from the South to the “industrial triangle,” to the factories of
Milan, Genoa, and Turin where they discovered the political and trade union
tradition of the pre-fascist generations, and brought new life into the struggle
for better conditions and wages. This social and cross-regional mobilization
gave rise to great upheavals towards the end of the decade, involving the estab-
lishment of work councils, the renewal of the principal collective contracts, and
the Worker’s Statute, a law that granted formidable recognition to the trade
union movement. The workers took their action from the factories into
society, making a fundamental contribution to the country’s most important
social reforms, on the basis of principles enshrined in the 1948 Constitution,
which had, till that point, remained largely unenforced.18
In just a few years, the working class beneﬁted from a huge redistribution of
wealth and social mobility.19 Between 1968 and 1976 (peaking in the 1972 elec-
tions), the left-wing parties—Communist and Socialist—reached their highest
consensus and their largest majority among working-class voters. This was a
short parenthesis however: In the history of the Italian Republic, from 1945
onward, the workers of the North never yielded a majority to the Left.20
During the 1950s, the stronghold of the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI) was
in the countryside, which was undergoing a transformation towards a capitalist
economy, and among the urban middle class, in particular in the central regions
(Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany).21
In the political arena, the Left’s formidable opponent was the conservative,
multiclass, Catholic Democrazia Cristiana (DC). The DC had forged a hege-
monic consensus founded on the religious divide and widespread subsidized
and socially protected development (summed up in the slogan “One Factory
Per Bell-tower”). Thus, local and cultural afﬁliation, together with class, contrib-
uted to the creation of a two-coloredmap, with the country divided into areas and
cities that were either red or white. Two mass parties—PCI and DC—contended
popular consensus mediating on a central position for long-term “local political
subcultures.”22
In the areas dominated by large Fordist factories, the left-wing parties had
an advantage, but already from the 1970s onward, under the weight of economic
crisis, restructuring and the decline of industry, this foothold began to crumble.
Meanwhile, industry began to decline in favor of services. Already in 1977, the
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tertiary workforce had overtaken the secondary: After its short trajectory, the
age of “working-class centrality” was drawing to a close.
These changes affected not only the professional proﬁle of the workforce,
but also the country’s industrial makeup, with a sudden fall in the numbers
working in large factories and a parallel boom in blue collar workers in small
to medium businesses. This was the result, on the one hand, of decentralization
processes and, on the other, of pre-existing manufacturing traditions.
Sociologists and political scientists began to identify a “Third Italy”—coinciding
with some regions in the Centre and the North East—that had seemed invisible
in the traditional North-South interpretation.23 This “Third Italy” had a
completely different work culture than the large factories. Among other
things, workers there were willing to work long hours, they aspired to purchase
consumer goods (to become home owners ﬁrst and foremost), and to become
self-employed. While formally they were paid less than the workers in large fac-
tories, they often supplemented their income with substantial cash-in-hand
remuneration. Though not averse or hostile toward trade unions, they did
have speciﬁc needs. They were more interested in individual salaries, mobility,
ﬂexibility, services, and collaboration rather than working conditions, political
representation, negotiation, or class struggle.
While this world of workers was quietly expanding, the other was crum-
bling steadily. The failure of industrial action at the Fiat plant in Turin, which
ended in twenty thousand workers being put on a redundancy scheme, was
the prelude to an endless series of reorganizations among the major Italian
industrial groups. It continued with a collapse in trade union unity (one of the
most signiﬁcant political achievements of the 1960s and 1970s), which occurred
during the reform of an index designed to protect salaries from inﬂation (the
so-called scala mobile). In 1985, the PCI suffered a resounding defeat in a refe-
rendum aimed at blocking this reform, which was being promoted by a socialist
government intent on normalizing industrial relations and pursuing a policy of
capitalist modernization.
Quite suddenly, the atmosphere changed in Italian factories and among
workers. Travelling through the factories and residential quarters of the Fiat
workers in 1988, the journalistGadLerner gave a voice to aworld of disorientated
men, workers who, within a few years, had gone from seeing themselves at the
forefront of a political revolution to feeling like social refuse. In particular,
meeting the inhabitants of Miraﬁori Sud, Turin’s signature working-class area,
Lerner became painfully aware of “the deﬁnitive dissolution of any form of
working-class identity.”24As itwas tooearly for that senseof loss to be collectively
processed or publicly voiced, the workers’ path out of working-class identity took
underground routes, which could only be understood and explained in hindsight.
Lega Nord
LN was born in 1989 with the fusion of two regional movements: one from
Veneto (Liga Veneta: using liga, which is lega in Veneto dialect) and one
“Italians First” 105
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from Lombardy (Lega Lombarda). The Veneto region was the birthplace of the
movement.25 A mainly agricultural region and source of emigration since the
uniﬁcation of Italy, Veneto had been deﬁned as the “South of the North.” The
Catholic Church’s widespread network across the region and the overwhelming
hegemony of the Catholic party (after the war in some municipalities, the DC
won eighty percent of the votes) earned Veneto the label “the Vandée of
Italy.”26
During the 1970s, this backward Veneto underwent extraordinary develop-
ment thanks to an economy of small and medium businesses. Through hard
work and the support of family networks, many farmers and workers were
able to become entrepreneurs. Small and medium businesses were not
exempt from the inﬂuence of the growing trade union movement; in industrial-
ized rural areas, competition was intense between the two major unions, the red
CGIL and the white Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL).27
Though CGIL gained ground in Veneto, it had little effect on the political dom-
inance of the DC. The only exceptions were the southernmost province
(Rovigo), a typically red area of left-wing farm laborers, and the huge industrial
area of Porto Marghera (Venice). The part of the region with the highest level of
moderate clerical consensus (i.e., political consensus towards DC and the
Church in general)—the upper part of the plain of the Po river valley and the
foothills of the Alps, the so-called “Pedemontana”—was also the area with
the highest concentration of small-scale industry.
Liga Veneta was founded in 1980 and, surprisingly, after three years it won
three seats in the parliament. Even areas with a high concentration of workers
and with a signiﬁcant socialist and trade union tradition, like Schio, a factory
town near Vicenza and the birthplace of the textile industry, showed support
for this small political party.
In their very ﬁrst election manifesto, after a call for political independence,
the second point put forward by Liga Veneta was “precedence to be given to
Veneto-born workers in the work place and in social services.”28 At that time,
local people in Veneto did not see non-EU workers as a threat, instead it was
southern Italians who found jobs, not so much in industry but in the public
sector and particularly in schools. By claiming a priority, Liga Veneta was
giving a voice to popular anti-southern sentiments. Persistent anti-state preju-
dice was being projected on the South.29 In Liga Veneta propaganda, southern
Italians were described as lazy, unproductive, and used to expecting beneﬁts.
This image found particular support among the workers of small and medium
enterprises, who were accustomed to working longer and harder than normal
labor contracts, to mobility on the labor market and who were less inﬂuenced
by union policies of public support for the economic development of the South.
A decisive turning point was the devastating earthquake that hit some
southern regions in the autumn of 1980. Many workers from the North, includ-
ing Veneto, joined the effort to bring aid to the stricken population. Some of
these returned feeling disappointed by the passive and fatalist attitude they
encountered among the local population. They compared the inefﬁciency they
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perceived to the Northern region of Friuli, which had been struck by an equally
strong earthquake just four years earlier.30 During the 1980s grafﬁti began to
appear, even in strongly working class and unionised areas, calling for an erup-
tion of Mount Etna in Sicily. During the early days of Liga Veneta, a poor man’s
movement born among the lower levels of society, these grafﬁti were an impor-
tant tool of political propaganda.
The Trade Unions
The transformation in the world of labor during the 1980s (widespread industri-
alization, crises in large industry, outsourcing, and internationalized markets)
drove a wedge between workers and the traditional political parties. This
became evident in the virulent economic and institutional crisis that exploded
at the beginning of the 1990s. In rapid succession, Italy suffered a dramatic
ﬁnancial crisis, the greatest corruption scandal in its history (the so-called
“clean hands” investigation), the changeover to a majority electoral system
and the disappearance of the republic’s major, historical political parties. DC
and the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) were crushed under the weight of judi-
cial investigation, while, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, PCI decided on its own
dissolution and abandoned its ties to communist ideology. Large public enter-
prises were liquidated and serious restructuring and privatization plans began
to come into effect. Between 1992 and 1993, the unions, the government, and
employers’ associations established broad framework agreements on labor.
Wage restraints were set to reduce inﬂation, new representation systems were
established in the workplace, and contract negotiations became subordinate
to productivity and competitiveness.
Within the context of this system in crisis—which is often referred to as the
beginning of the Second Italian Republic—new political phenomena appeared:
Silvio Berlusconi’s political party and the extraordinary adventures of LN. In the
last elections of the First Republic, LN achieved amazing results in Lombardy
(twenty-three percent) and Veneto (twenty-six percent, including other
groups that supported autonomy). On the Left, this success was interpreted as
a protest against the State led by small entrepreneurs, the selﬁsh resentment
of the rich, “a mass withdrawal from the State led by the very middle class
that was traditionally the foundation of consensus.”31 That workers might
have given their vote to LN was hardly considered, despite clear signals that
this was indeed happening. In 1992, for example, in an area of Veneto with a
strong working-class tradition (Conegliano, home of Zoppas, one of Italy’s
largest electrical appliance manufacturers), the Center-Left candidate Franco
Bentivogli, an important trade union leader, was solidly defeated by the LN can-
didate who was preferred by many of Bentivogli’s own workers.32
It was during this period that the ﬁrst non-EU immigrants began to replace
the terroni (a derogative term used to describe workers from the South) as cat-
alysts to fuel fears among groups who felt threatened by change. LNmanaged to
acquire an identity as a party for the people, far from the halls of power and
“Italians First” 107
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willing to provide protection from the ever-growing fear of foreign criminality.
The party presented itself as the voice of local producers, entrepreneurs, and
workers, who, as we have seen, in the world of small businesses were ﬂuid cat-
egories and bled into each other. The slogan “People of Veneto First” (which
today has become “Italians ﬁrst”) began to be thought of as plain common
sense among many workers, and even among many grass roots union represen-
tatives. LN even tried to set up its own union (SINPA, the union of the Po
Valley), but failed: Workers stayed faithful to their traditional organizations,
which were better equipped and more effective in representing them.
Activists in the union CISL were the ﬁrst to adopt the opinions expressed
by LN and they were gradually followed by CGIL.33 Many workers voted LN
though they still retained membership of left-wing trade unions, much as they
had done in the past with DC. They continued, in other words, to ﬁnd no con-
tradiction in being part of a trade union movement, even engaging in conﬂicts
on the factory ﬂoor, while remaining politically conservative.34
The extent to which LN’s discourse—“the Veneto people ﬁrst” and now
“Italians ﬁrst”—has also infected CGIL can be understood from the surprising
appeal made by a senior union ﬁgure, who called on entrepreneurs in the foot-
wear industry to hire Italian workers because they worked harder and were
more adept at defending wage levels.35 This statement—which met with scant
protest from the union as a whole—is a sign of how far the ethos of LN has
spread and shows how the issue of workers’ consensus with right-wing populism
goes beyond the ballot box; it has become a broader issue, related to the evolu-
tion, amidst persistence and repression, of working-class culture. Furthermore,
LN has even broken the last stronghold of the Left and the working-class
vote: the so-called “red” regions of Central Italy.36
A Changing Scenario
The last general election took place in February 2013.37 The great novelty was
an exceptional twenty-ﬁve percent won by the Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S),
a party founded in 2009 by the comedian and actor Beppe Grillo, the movement
had grown out of Grillo’s personal blog. M5S might be deﬁned as the master-
piece of the Italian populist laboratory. It is particularly difﬁcult to position
along the classic left-right axis—both due to the eclectic ideological mix pro-
fessed by its executive group and to the heterogeneous make-up of its grass
roots.
For LN, the 2013 elections were something of a meltdown: On a national
level, the party fell from 8.3 to 4.1 percent, but the decline was even greater
in areas where its historical roots were deepest, such as the Veneto. It is legiti-
mate to presume that the LN vote shifted toward M5S.38 A foretaste of this shift
had already been seen the previous year when the ﬁrst M5S mayor was elected
in a tiny Veneto municipality where LN had previously enjoyed very strong
support (Sarego, in the province of Vicenza). The LN candidate was beaten
by a slim majority.39 Since then, M5S has won many of the larger cities including
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the capital (for many years referred to as “Rome the robber” in LN propaganda,
a symbol of all the country’s woes), and it now openly campaigns to govern the
country after the 2018 elections.
Alongside its attacks on politics, bureaucracy, and ﬁnance, M5S is now
putting forward concrete proposals regarding employment. Its analysis starts
from the premise that industrial society has had its day and that work in the
future will be, for the most part, immaterial, intellectual, robotic, digital, and,
above all, there will not be enough to go around. Its ﬁrst answer would be a
“basic income” for the unemployed and for citizens who live below the
poverty line, as well as wage integration to increase pay for underpaid
workers. Recently M5S commissioned a provisional study on work projected
over the next ten years from Domenico De Masi, a retired Professor of the
Sociology of Work. De Masi’s strange solution consists of a reduction of
overall working hours, to be achieved by having the unemployed work for
free. This, in his opinion, would change the labor market to such an extent as
to inevitably force a more equitable redistribution of employment.40 The unem-
ployed would offer their skills through an online platform, unleashing “brutal
competition that would break the labour market and thus force the unions to
come to the negotiation table and agree to have the 23 million employed give
over 10 percent of their hours to the 3.1 million unemployed.”41 It is evident
that this is an impracticable proposal, and it has already been met with wide-
spread criticism among experts; it also illustrates the provocative and demagogic
approach M5S takes to social issues.
Even if Grillo’s party seems to be more attractive to the unemployed and
post-industrial workers, including the “second-generation self-employed”42 who
are precariously poised today between the middle and working classes and
make up the backbone of M5S activists, we still need to ask why the party has
become palatable to blue-collar workers. This fact has emerged from various
polls, and it is also perceived by people who are with them in the front line,
such as former CGIL’s national secretary for mechanics, Maurizio Landini.43
Workers “on the shop ﬂoor follow the union, but then, they vote Grillo,”
despite the fact that M5S is not organized in the workplace.44 There is no
doubt that the workers’ sympathy for M5S also involves some aspects of an anti-
bureaucracy protest, which also targets union leaders. Indeed, it could be that a
large number of workers are convinced—in Grillo’s words—that “class struggle
has been substituted by caste struggle, or better, by a struggle between those
who produce wealth and social services, and a parasitic class, the castes.”45
However, we are left to wonder if the working-class vote yet again, or even
more than ever, will reward a (demagogic) claim to protect the labor market
from foreign competition. The most recent local elections held in Monfalcone
(Trieste) suggest that this is a possible outcome. Monfalcone is known as the
“Italian Danzig” as it has one of the largest shipbuilding industries in Europe.
The management of Fincantieri sing the praises of its “reverse delocalization”
model in which hundreds of outsourced companies, many registered abroad
with contracts signed in foreign countries, employ one thousand Italian
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workers alongside ﬁve thousand foreigners, the majority of whom come from
Bangladesh. This model allows for an exceptional reduction in the cost of
labor and record productivity.
Though it is a city with a long socialist and trade union tradition, in 2016,
Monfalcone elected a LN mayor, and it is the ﬁrst time since the birth of the
Italian Republic that the city has had a right-wing mayor. No doubt the presence
of foreign workers in the shipyard played a role in this result and led to senti-
ments that work ought to be given “to our workers ﬁrst.” Many of these
workers see no contradiction between this demand and the classic left-wing
battles for job security and a digniﬁed wage since they are at risk from what
they perceive as unfair foreign competition.
We might be inclined to say that in Monfalcone class struggle has won over
Grillo’s “caste struggle” against the parasitic elites; unfortunately, however, it
has been an internal class struggle: local workers against global workers. The
early LN slogan “Terroni Out” widely used in the heyday of Italian industriali-
zation has now been replaced during the current crisis by the more updated
“Stop Bangla.”
The Monfalcone shipyard was one of many stops in another, more recent
journey undertaken by Gad Lerner among Italian workers—a television inves-
tigation broadcast by the public television service in a time slot that guaranteed
the smallest possible number of viewers.46 In the canteen at Fincantieri, Lerner
interviewed a worker who is also a municipal councillor for LN: In the factory,
he calls for precedence for Italian workers, while in the local constituency he
ﬁghts against accepting refugees. Meanwhile, the voices of workers on their
break can be heard in the background, a babel of languages that no longer
deﬁnes class identity, solidarity, or egalitarianism.
Lerner’s new report began in Turin, the same place he had conducted his
investigation thirty years earlier.47 Fiat Miraﬁori, which at that time was still
the largest factory in Italy, is now a highly automated plant with three thousand
workers employed by the multinational Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA). In
2011, a referendum was held that was excruciating for the trade union move-
ment: The workers chose to accept a new system of labor organization in the
plant known as World Class Manufacturing (WCM) to ensure that the factory
would continue operating.48 Lerner had dinner with a working class family
that is certain that red ﬂags will never ﬂy again above the factory gates; they
declared greater faith in Sergio Marchionne, the CEO of FCA, than in
Maurizio Landini, the secretary of the CGIL mechanics union at that time.
The Italian working class seems poised between two poles. Horizontally
there is a struggle for employment pitting the poor against the poor.
Vertically there is a voluntary acceptance of capitalist strategies and their
hidden forms of submission. However, Lerner’s journey also shows the many
new faces, cultures, and professions that make up the working class today, espe-
cially in the ﬁelds of services, logistics, and communications. To counter the
Italian workers’ decline into xenophobia, chauvinism, and populism, or
toward the most abject corporate subservience, it is necessary to redeﬁne the
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conﬁnes of the class that works to live. It exists, grows, and thinks about its living
and working conditions, even without political representation, often despising
party politics. The author of this article feels that the trade unions alone today
have the resources and the network of social connections to avoid these
wayward paths.
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